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Abstract—Efficient and fair allocation of multiple types of resources
is a crucial objective in a cloud/distributed computing cluster. Users
may have diverse resource needs. Furthermore, diversity in server
properties/capabilities may mean that only a subset of servers may
be usable by a given user. In platforms with such heterogeneity, we
identify important limitations in existing multi-resource fair allocation
mechanisms, notably Dominant Resource Fairness (DRF) and its follow-
up work. To overcome such limitations, we propose a new server-based
approach; each server allocates resources by maximizing a per-server
utility function. We propose a specific class of utility functions which,
when appropriately parameterized, adjusts the trade-off between effi-
ciency and fairness, and captures a variety of fairness measures (such
as our recently proposed Per-Server Dominant Share Fairness). We
establish conditions for the proposed mechanism to satisfy certain prop-
erties that are generally deemed desirable, e.g., envy-freeness, sharing
incentive, bottleneck fairness, and Pareto optimality. To implement our
resource allocation mechanism, we develop an iterative algorithm which
is shown to be globally convergent. Finally, we show how the proposed
mechanism could be implemented in a distributed fashion. We carry out
extensive trace-driven simulations to show the enhanced performance
of our proposed mechanism over the existing ones.
1 INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing has become increasingly popular as
it provides a cost-effective alternative to proprietary
high performance computing systems. As the work-
loads to data-centers housing cloud computing platforms
are intensively growing, developing an efficient and
fair allocation mechanism which guarantees quality-of-
service for different workloads has become increasingly
important. Efficient and fair resource allocation in such
a shared computing system is particularly challenging
because of (a) the presence of multiple types of resources,
(b) diversity in the workloads’ needs for these resources,
(c) heterogeneity in the resource capacities of servers,
and (d) placement constraints on which servers may be
used by a workload. In the following four paragraphs
we briefly elaborate on each of these complexities.
The multi-resource needs of cloud workloads imply that
conventional single-resource oriented notions of fairness
are inadequate [1]. Dominant Resource Fairness (DRF) is
the first allocation mechanism which describes a notion
of fairness for allocating multiple types of resources for
a single server system. Using DRF users receive a fair
share of their dominant resource [1]. Of all the resources
requested by the user (for every unit of work called a
task), its dominant resource is the one with the highest
demand when demands are expressed as fractions of the
overall resource capacities. DRF is shown to achieve sev-
eral properties that are commonly considered desirable
from a multi-resource fair allocation mechanism.
Heterogeneity of workloads’ resource demands is another
complexity which results in a trade-off between effi-
ciency and fairness. Specifically, heterogeneity of users’
demands may preclude some resources from being
fully utilized. Hence, the DRF allocation may result in
a poor resource utilization even when there is only
one server [2], [3], [4]. To address this issue, [2] pro-
posed to allocate resources by applying the so-called α-
proportional fairness (instead of max-min fairness [5]) on
dominant shares. The proposed mechanism, when ap-
propriately parameterized, adjusts the trade-off between
efficiency and fairness. However, it is applicable only to
a single server/resource-pool.
In the case of multiple heterogeneous servers, there are
several studies investigating/extending DRF allocation
when there is no placement constraint [6], [7], [8]. In all
of these works, fairness is defined in terms of a global
metric, a scalar parameter defined in terms of different
resources across all servers. E.g., [7] presents an extension
to DRF where the dominant resource for each user is
identified as if all resources were concatenated at one
server, and subsequently the resources are allocated by
applying max-min fairness on the dominant shares. Since
such a global metric may not perfectly capture the impact
of server heterogeneity, such approaches may lead to
an inefficient resource utilization (see Section 2.2 for
further discussions and Section 2.3 for an illustrative
example). Moreover, such mechanisms may not be read-
ily implementable in a distributed fashion [9], as each
The copyright is held by author/owner(s).
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2server needs information on the available resources over
all servers. Such information may not be available at
each server, especially in a cloud computing environ-
ment where the resource capacities (and even activity
of servers) might be churning.
There are limited works in the literature investigating
multi-resource fair allocation in the presence of user place-
ment constraints [10], [11]. In this case, it is yet unclear
how to globally identify the dominant resource as well
as the dominant share for different users, as each one
may have access only to a subset of servers. Work in [11]
presents an extension to DRF identifying the user share
by ignoring placement constraints and applying a similar
approach as in an unconstrained setting. We show that
this approach may not achieve fairness in the specific
case that one of the resources serves as a bottleneck (see
Section 2.2).
In [12] we proposed a multi-resource fair allocation
mechanism, called PS-DSF, which is applicable to hetero-
geneous servers in the presence of placement constraints.
The intuition behind PS-DSF is to capture the impact
of server heterogeneity by measuring the total allocated
resources to each user explicitly from the perspective
of each server. Specifically, PS-DSF identifies a virtual
dominant share (VDS) for each user with respect to each
server (as opposed to a single system-wide dominant
share in DRF). The VDS for user n with respect to server i
is defined as the ratio of xn - the total number of tasks al-
located to user n - over the number of tasks executable by
user n when monopolizing server i. Then the resources at
each server are allocated by applying max-min fairness
on VDS (see Section 2.3 for a detailed discussion). This
approach is amenable to a distributed implementation.
It results in an enhanced performance over the existing
mechanisms, and satisfies certain properties essential for
fair allocation of resources [12].
1.1 Contributions
In this paper, we build upon and generalize our pro-
posed PS-DSF allocation mechanism [12] to capture the
trade-off between efficiency and fairness. We concisely sum-
marize our contributions.
• We propose a new server-based formulation (which in-
cludes PS-DSF as a special case) to allocate resources
while capturing server heterogeneity. The new formu-
lation can be viewed as a concave game among different
servers, where each server allocates resources by max-
imizing a per-server utility function (Section 3.1).
• We study a specific class of utility functions which
results in an extension of α-proportional fairness on
VDS. We show how the resulting allocation, which
we call αPF-VDS, captures the trade-off between ef-
ficiency and fairness by adjusting the parameter α. We
show that αPF-VDS satisfies bottleneck fairness, envy-
freeness and sharing incentive properties (as defined
in Section 2.1) for α ≥ 1, and Pareto optimality for
α = 1 (Section 3.2 and 3.3).
• We develop a (centralized) convergent algorithm to
implement our proposed mechanism. Towards this,
we introduce an equivalent formulation for which we
derive an iterative solution (Section 4 and 5.1).
• We propose a simple heuristic to develop a distributed
implementation for our resource allocation mechanism
(Section 5.2).
• We carry-out extensive simulations, driven by real-
world traces, to show the enhanced performance of
our proposed mechanism (Section 6).
1.2 Related Work
Resource allocation with a game-theoretic approach.
There are several works in the literature which study
the resource allocation problem in a cloud computing
environment with a game-theoretic approach [13], [14],
[15], [16], [17], [18]. Among these, [13], [14], [15] are
limited to a single-resource setting, while [16], [17], [18]
consider a multi-resource environment. In these studies
the multi-resource allocation problem is formulated as
a game, where players are different servers. Since they
choose DRF as the underlying notion of fairness, they
will have the same limitations as DRF for heteroge-
neous servers (see Section 2.2 for a discussion of such
limitations). Moreover, some of them need to solve an
extensive form game with a huge strategy set space, e.g.,
[16], which may not be implementable in a distributed
fashion.
Scheduling in the presence of placement constraints.
There are some recent works investigating max-min fair
allocation/scheduling for one type of resource while
respecting placement constraints [19], [20], [21], [22],
[23]. These single-resource schedulers could be useful
in a multi-resource setting when one of the resources
is dominantly requested by all users. Otherwise, they
might result in a poor resource utilization [1], [19].
2 MODEL AND BACKGROUND WORK
Consider a set K of K heterogeneous servers/resource-
pools1 each containing M types of resources. We denote
by ci,r ≥ 0, the capacity (i.e., amount) of resource r
(1, 2, · · · ,M) on server i. We make the reasonable as-
sumption that all resources on each server are arbitrarily
divisible among the users running on it. Let N denote
the set of N active users. Let φn > 0 denote the weight
associated with user n. The weights reflect the priority of
users with respect to each other. Let dn = [dn,r] denote
the per task demand vector for user n ∈ N , i.e., the
amount of each resource required for executing one task
for user n. Let xn,i ∈ R+ denote the number of tasks that
are allocated to user n from server i. Assuming linearly
proportionate resource-needs2, xn,idn = [xn,idn,r] gives
1. A resource-pool may consist of a group of homogeneous servers.
2. The assumption of linearly proportionate resource needs is admit-
tedly an idealization. We are following convention set by DRF and used
by follow up works.
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User 1 User 2 
User 3 User 4 
Fig. 1: A heterogeneous multi-resource system with two servers and
four equally weighted users.
the amounts of different resources demanded by user n
from server i.
Due to heterogeneity of users and servers, each user
may be restricted to get service only from a subset of
servers. For example, users may not run tasks on servers
which lack some required resources. Furthermore, each
user may have some special hardware/software require-
ments (e.g., public IP address, a particular kernel version,
GPU, etc.) which further restrict the set of servers that
the user’s tasks may run on. Let Ni 6= ∅ denote the set
of eligible users for server i. The placement constraints
imply that xn,i = 0, n /∈ Ni, ∀i.
For instance, consider the example in Fig. 1, where
three types of resources, CPU, RAM, and network
bandwidth are available over two servers in the
amounts of c1 =[12 cores, 4GB, 75Mb/s] and c2 =[8
cores, 16GB, 0Mb/s], where no communication band-
width is available over the second server; four users with
their corresponding demand vectors are also shown in
the figure. In this example, the first two users require
network bandwidth for execution of their tasks, so they
are not eligible to run tasks on the second server. How-
ever, the last two users may run tasks on both servers.
2.1 Dominant resource fairness
Multi-resource fair allocation was originally studied in
[1] under the assumption that all resources are aggre-
gated at one resource-pool. Specifically, let cr denote the
total capacity of resource r. Let an = [an,r] denote the
amounts of different resources allocated to user n under
some allocation mechanism. The utilization of user n of
its allocated resources, Un(an), is defined as the number
of tasks, xn, which could be executed using an, that is:
Un(an) , xn = min
r
an,r
dn,r
. (1)
In [1] the following properties are deemed desirable for
a multi-resource allocation mechanism.
• Sharing incentive: Each user is able to run more tasks
compared to a uniform allocation where each user n is
allocated a φn/
∑
m φm fraction of each resource.
• Envy freeness: A user should not prefer the alloca-
tion vector of another user when adjusted according
to their weights, i.e., it should hold that Un(an) ≥
Un(
φn
φm
am) for all n,m.
• Bottleneck fairness: If there is one resource which is
dominantly requested by every user, then the allocation
satisfies max-min fairness for that resource.
• Pareto optimality: It should not be possible to increase
the number of tasks xn for any user n, without de-
creasing xm for some other user(s).
• Strategy proofness: Users should not be able to in-
crease their utilization by erroneously declaring their
resource demands.
The reader is referred to [1] or [24] for further details.
Sharing incentive provides some sort of performance
isolation, as it guarantees a minimum utilization for
each user irrespective of the demands of the other users.
Envy freeness embodies the notion of fairness. Bottleneck
fairness describes a necessary condition which applies to
a specific case that one resource is dominantly requested
by every user, so that a single-resource notion of fairness is
applicable. These three properties are essential to achieve
fairness. So, we refer to them as essential fairness-related
properties. Pareto optimality is a benchmark for max-
imizing system utilization. Finally, strategy proofness
prevents users from gaming the allocation mechanism. In
our view these properties are applicable mainly for pri-
vate settings. In public settings, users pay explicit costs
for their usage or allocations and the provider’s goal is to
maximize its profits subject to allocation guarantees for
users. Even for private clouds, strategy proofness would
only be necessary in settings where users act selfishly.
In many private settings, users are cooperative and here
strategy proofness is not needed. In view of this, we will
not consider strategy proofness.
DRF is the first multi-resource allocation mechanism
satisfying all the above properties. Specifically, for every
user n, the Dominant Resource (DR) is defined as [1]:
ρ(n) := arg max
r
dn,r/cr, (2)
that is, the resource whose greatest portion is required
for execution of one task for user n. The fraction of the
DR that is allocated to user n is defined as its dominant
share:
sn :=
an,ρ(n)
cρ(n)
. (3)
Without loss of generality, we may restrict ourselves
to non-wasteful allocations, i.e., an = xndn, ∀n. Hence,
an allocation {xn} is feasible when:∑
n
xndn,r ≤ cr, ∀r. (4)
Definition 1. An allocation {xn} satisfies DRF, if it is
feasible and the weighted dominant share for each user, sn/φn
cannot be increased while maintaining feasibility without
decreasing sm for some user m with sm/φm ≤ sn/φn [1].
4DRF is a restatement of max-min fairness in terms of
dominant shares. What make it appealing are the desir-
able properties which are satisfied under this allocation
mechanism.
2.2 Existing challenges with heterogeneous servers
and placement constraints
In case of heterogeneous servers (whether there are any
placement constraints or not), a natural approach to ex-
tend DRF is to identify a system-wide dominant resource
for each user, as if all resources were concatenated within
a single virtual server. Specifically, let cr :=
∑
i ci,r denote
the total capacity of resource r within such a virtual
server. Then, one may identify the dominant resource
for each user n according to (2). Furthermore, the global
dominant share for user n is given by:
sn = xn max
r
dn,r
cr
, (5)
where xn is the total number of tasks that are allocated
to user n from different servers, that is xn :=
∑
i xn,i. As
in Definition 1, one may find an allocation {xn,i} which
satisfies max-min fairness in terms of the global domi-
nant shares [7]. Such as allocation mechanism, referred to
as DRFH, is shown to achieve Pareto optimality and envy
freeness. However, it fails to provide sharing incentive [7].
We believe that the definition of bottleneck fairness
employed by DRFH (with respect to a single virtual
server that aggregates all resources) is also controversial.
Specifically, if all users have the same dominant resource
(with respect to the above mentioned virtual server), then
DRFH satisfies max-min fairness with respect to such
a resource [7]. In case of heterogeneous servers with
placement constraints, however, one may consider other
conditions under which a resource serves as a bottleneck.
Definition 2. A resource ρ is said to be a bottleneck if for
every server i:
dn,ρ
ci,ρ
≥ dn,r
ci,r
, ∀r, n ∈ Ni. (6)
If there exists a bottleneck resource, then the allocation should
satisfy max-min fairness with respect to that resource.
Unfortunately, DRFH does not satisfy bottleneck fair-
ness in the sense of Definition 2. To appreciate this short-
coming of the DRFH mechanism, consider the example
in Fig. 1, where the second resource (RAM) is dominantly
requested by eligible users at each server. According to
Definition 2, RAM is identified as the bottleneck resource
in this example. To allocate the RAM resources in a fair
manner, each user should be allocated x1 = x1,1 = 2,
x2 = x2,1 = 6, x3 = x3,2 = 8 and x4 = x4,2 = 8 tasks,
respectively (This allocation results from our proposed
PS-DSF allocation mechanism [12]). On the other hand,
the DRFH mechanism would instead identify network
bandwidth as the dominant resource for the first two
users and RAM as the dominant resource for the last two
users. To achieve max-min fairness in terms of dominant
shares, the DRFH mechanism allocates x1 = x2 = 3 and
x3 = x4 = 8 tasks to each user. Under such an allocation,
the RAM resources are not allocated in a fair manner to
the first two users.
Yet another extension of DRF, which applies to hetero-
geneous servers in the presence of placement constraints,
is TSF [11]. As in [11], we let γn,i denote the number
of tasks that user n may execute when monopolizing
server i (i.e., when n is the only user). Let γn :=
∑
i γn,i
be defined as the number of tasks executable for user
n when monopolizing all servers as if there were no
placement constraints. An allocation is said to satisfy
Task Share Fairness (TSF), when xn/γn satisfies max-
min fairness [11]. When there is only one server, then
xn/γn results in the dominant share for each user n.
In such case, TSF reduces to DRF. In case of heteroge-
neous servers with placement constraints, TSF is shown
to satisfy Pareto optimality, envy freeness and sharing
incentive properties [11]. However, we show by example
that this mechanism may not satisfy bottleneck fairness
(neither in the sense of Definition 2, nor in the conven-
tional sense based on considering a single virtual server
introduced above [12]).
For instance, consider again the example in Fig. 1,
where the second resource is identified as a bottleneck
according to Definition 2. The number of tasks that each
user may run in the whole cluster is γ1 = 4, γ2 = 12,
and γ3 = γ4 = 4 + 16 = 20 tasks, respectively. Hence,
each user is allocated x1 = x1,1 = 5/3, x2 = x2,1 = 5,
x3 = x3,1 + x3,2 = 8 + 1/3 = 25/3 and x4 = x4,1 + x4,2 =
8 + 1/3 = 25/3 tasks, according to the TSF mechanism,
which differs from the fair allocation in this example.
2.3 Per-server dominant share fairness (PS-DSF)
In this subsection, we describe PS-DSF which we intro-
duced in [12]. PS-DSF is an extension to DRF which is
applicable for heterogeneous servers in the presence of
placement constraints. The core idea of this mechanism
is to introduce a “virtual dominant share” for every user,
with respect to each server. Towards this, we first identify
the dominant resource for every user n with respect to
each server i,
ρ(n, i) := arg max
r
dn,r
ci,r
. (7)
Let γn,i denote the number of tasks which could be
executed by user n ∈ Ni when monopolizes server i,
γn,i := min
r
ci,r
dn,r
=
ci,ρ(n,i)
dn,ρ(n,i)
, n ∈ Ni. (8)
It is assumed that γn,i > 0 for all n ∈ Ni. We set γn,i = 0
if n /∈ Ni.
Definition 3. The Virtual Dominant Share (VDS) for user
n with respect to server i, sn,i, is defined as:
sn,i :=
xn
γn,i
=
xndn,ρ(n,i)
ci,ρ(n,i)
, (9)
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Fig. 2: Comparing the PS-DSF allocation with the DRFH and TSF
allocations. The PS-DSF allocation mechanism is more efficient in
utilizing different resources.
where xn =
∑
j xn,j is the total number of tasks that are
allocated to user n (whether or not these tasks are actually
allocated using server i).
We have the following conditions on an allocation,
x := {xn,i ∈ R+ | n ∈ N , i ∈ K}, to be feasible:∑
n∈Ni
xn,idn,r ≤ ci,r, ∀i, r. (10)
xn,i = 0, n /∈ Ni, ∀i. (11)
Definition 4. An allocation x satisfies PS-DSF, if it is feasible
and the allocated tasks to each user, xn cannot be increased
(while maintaining feasibility) without decreasing xm,i for
some user m and server i with sm,i/φm ≤ sn,i/φn.
Intuitively, sn,i gives the normalized share of the dom-
inant resource for user n with respect to server i which
should be allocated to it as if xn tasks were allocated
resources solely from server i (see the right hand side
of (9)). The reader may note that sn,i could be possibly
greater than 1, as some tasks might be allocated to user
n from other servers. According to PS-DSF, the available
resources at each server i are allocated by applying
(weighted) max-min fairness on {sn,i}. It can be seen that
PS-DSF reduces to DRF when there is only one server.
To gain more intuition, consider again the example in
Fig. 1, but this time let d4 = [1, 0.5, 0]. In this case, each
user may run γ1,1 = 4, γ2,1 = 12, γ3,1 = 4, γ4,1 = 8 tasks
when monopolizing server 1. The third and the fourth
users each may run γ3,2 = 16 and γ4,2 = 8 tasks when
monopolizing server 2. In order to satisfy PS-DSF, each
user should be allocated x1 = x1,1 = 2, x2 = x2,1 = 6,
x3 = x3,2 = 32/3 and x4 = x4,2 = 16/3 tasks, respectively.
Therefore, the VDS (c.f. Definition 3) for each user with
respect to the first server is s1,1 = s2,1 = 0.5, s3,1 = 8/3
and s4,1 = 2/3. Also, the VDS for user 3 and 4 with
respect to the second server is s3,2 = s4,2 = 2/3. The
reader can verify that for each server i the allocated tasks
to any user may not be increased without decreasing
the allocated tasks to another user with a less or equal
VDS. The resulting PS-DSF allocation is shown in Fig. 2.
The DRFH and TSF allocations for this example are also
illustrated in Fig. 2. It can be seen that the PS-DSF allo-
cation mechanism is more efficient in utilizing different
resources compared to the DRFH and TSF mechanisms.
Table 1: Properties of different allocation mechanisms in case of
heterogeneous servers with placement constraints: sharing incentive
(SI), envy freeness (EF), Pareto optimality (PO), and bottleneck fairness
(BF).
Property DRFH TSF PS-DSF
SI X X
EF X X X
PO X X
BF X
The reader may note that PS-DSF does not satisfy
Pareto optimality in general. It is worth noting that
Pareto optimality may not also be satisfied in other
works, e.g., [17], [18], which aim at developing a dis-
tributed implementation for DRFH. PS-DSF not only is
amenable to distributed implementation (as we show
in [12]), but also may lead to more efficient utilization
of resources compared to the DRFH and TSF mecha-
nisms [12] (as also can be observed in Fig. 2, or in
the trace-driven simulations in Section 6). The intuitive
reason for this is that each of the DRFH and TSF allo-
cation mechanisms allocates resources based on a global
metric. Since a global metric throws away information
about the actual distribution of resources across servers,
approaches based on it may not perfectly capture the
impact of server heterogeneity, and therefore may lead
to an inefficient resource utilization in heterogeneous
settings.
In summary, PS-DSF has been shown to satisfy the
essential fairness-related properties, i.e., envy-freeness,
sharing incentive and bottleneck fairness, has been ob-
served to offer highly efficient utilization of resources,
and is amenable to distributed implementation [12].
63 A SERVER-BASED APPROACH FOR MULTI-
RESOURCE ALLOCATION
As already discussed, in most of the existing multi-
resource allocation mechanisms, fairness is defined in
terms of a global metric, a scalar parameter defined
for each user in terms of different resources across all
servers. Such mechanisms may not succeed in satis-
fying all the essential fairness-related properties (c.f.
Section 2.2), may not readily be implementable in a
distributed fashion, and may lead to inefficient resource
utilization. In this section, we propose a new formulation
for multi-resource allocation problem which is based on
a per-server metric (as opposed to a global metric) for
different users, so that server heterogeneity is captured.
The proposed allocation mechanism is built upon our
proposed PS-DSF allocation mechanism [12], which was
briefly described in the previous section. It generalizes
PS-DSF in order to address the trade-off between ef-
ficiency and fairness. Furthermore, it inherits all the
properties that are satisfied by PS-DSF.
3.1 Problem formulation
As defined in Section 2.3, the VDS is a per-server metric
which gives a measure of the allocated resources to
each user from the perspective of each server. According
to PS-DSF, the available resources at each server are
allocated by applying max-min fairness on VDS. In order
to address the trade-off between efficiency and fairness,
we may choose to allocate resources at each server by
applying the so-called α-proportional fairness [25] on VDS.
To this end, we propose a general formulation, where
each server i strives to maximize a “per-server utility func-
tion”. Specifically, each server i tries to find an allocation
xi := [xn,i] which solves the following problem3.
Problem 1. For every server i:
max
xi
Ui(xi,x−i) :=
∑
n∈Ni
φngi
(
xn
φnγn,i
)
(12)
Subject to:
∑
n∈Ni
xn,idn,r ≤ ci,r, ∀r, (13)
xn,i ≥ 0, ∀n ∈ Ni, (14)
xn,i = 0, ∀n /∈ Ni, (15)
where xn =
∑
j xn,j , and gi(·), as can be also seen in [25], is a
scalar function, which is twice-differentiable, strictly concave,
and increasing.
Definition 5. An allocation x is said to be feasible if it
satisfies the feasibility conditions in (13)-(15) for all servers.
In Section 3.2, we will present specific choices for gi(·),
which capture the trade-off between efficiency and fairness,
3. The utility of each server, as defined by (12), depends on its-own
allocation/action, xi, as well as actions taken by other servers, x−i :=
{xj | j 6= i}. This is the standard notation used in the context of game
theory.
and span a variety of allocations, including the so-called
proportional fair allocation, and the PS-DSF allocation.
Solving Problem 1 concurrently over different servers
is a game, where each server strives to maximize its-own
utility. In fact, Problem 1 describes a concave game whose
players are different servers. It is well-known that a
Nash Equilibrium4 (NE) always exists for such a concave
game [26]. Further discussions on the structure of the
solution set (Nash equilibriums), and some conditions
governing uniqueness of the solution, will be described
in Section 4.
3.2 α-proportional fairness on virtual dominant
shares
At the optimal solution(s) to Problem 1, not all capacity
constraints may be active. In fact, there exist trade-
offs between efficiency and fairness, which depend on
the specific choice of gi(·). To capture the trade-off
between efficiency and fairness, one may choose gi(·)
from the class of α-fair utility functions [25]. Specifically,
we choose gi(z) such that g′i(z) = z
−α, for some fixed
parameter α. For this class of utility functions, the op-
timal solution to Problem 1 satisfies an extension of α-
proportional fairness in terms of virtual dominant shares,
which we call “α-Proportional Fairness on VDS”, or in
short αPF-VDS.
Definition 6. A feasible allocation, x, satisfies αPF-VDS, if
for every feasible allocation y, and for every server i:∑
n∈Ni
(yn,i − xn,i)/γn,i
s˜αn,i
≤ 0, (16)
where s˜n,i := sn,i/φn = xn/γn,iφn is the weighted VDS for
user n with respect to server i.
Theorem 1. Let gi(z) be from the class of α-fair utility
functions with g′i(z) = z
−α, α > 0. A feasible allocation, x,
is a solution to Problem 1 if and only if it satisfies αPF-VDS.
The proof is given in the appendix. The following
theorem, again proven in the appendix, describes how
αPF-VDS is related to other notions of fairness.
Theorem 2. The αPF-VDS allocation is weighted proportion-
ally fair5 for α = 1, and approaches a PS-DSF allocation as
α→∞.
Consider again the example in Fig. 1, but let d4 =
[1, 0.5, 0]. In this example, αPF-VDS results in the same
allocation at server 1, for every α > 0. In other words, the
αPF-VDS allocation coincides with the PS-DSF allocation
at server 1, for every α > 0. The reason is that RAM is
dominantly requested by both of users 1 and 2 which
4. A feasible allocation (x∗i ,x
∗
−i) is a Nash Equilibrium if no uni-
lateral deviation in action by any single server/player is profitable for
that server. That is, ∀i, ∀ (feasible) xi : Ui(x∗i ,x∗−i) ≥ Ui(xi,x∗−i)
5. An allocation, x, is weighted proportionally fair if it is feasible,
and if for any other feasible allocation, y, the weighted summation of
proportional changes is not positive, i.e.,
∑
n φn
yn−xn
xn
≤ 0 (see [27]).
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Fig. 3: An illustration of how the αPF-VDS allocation mechanism can
be parameterized (via α) to capture the tradeoff between efficiency and
fairness.
are allocated resources using server 1 (see Corollary 1).
The αPF-VDS allocation for server 2 is depicted in Fig. 3,
for α = 1 (proportional fair allocation), α = 3, and
α = ∞ (PS-DSF allocation). It can be observed that the
proportional fair allocation is more efficient in utilizing
different resources. However, eligible users for this server
tend to get the same portion of their respective dominant
resources as α→∞. This shows how α-PF-VDS captures
the tradeoff between efficiency and fairness.
3.3 The properties of the αPF-VDS allocation mech-
anism
In this section, we investigate different properties which
are satisfied by the αPF-VDS mechanism. In case of
heterogeneous servers with placement constraints, we
need to extend the notion of sharing incentive property.
The notion of bottleneck fairness has been extended
by Definition 2. Other properties, Pareto optimality and
envy freeness follow the same definitions as described in
Section 2. To generalize the sharing incentive property,
consider a uniform allocation, where a fraction φn/
∑
m φm
of the available resources over each server (whether this
server is eligible or not) is allocated to each user n.
An allocation is said to satisfy sharing incentive, when
each user is able to run more tasks compared to such a
uniform allocation.
Theorem 3. The αPF-VDS allocation mechanism satisfies
envy-freeness and sharing incentive properties for every α ≥ 1.
It also satisfies Pareto optimality for α = 1.
In case that all resources are integrated at one server,
[2] has proposed an allocation mechanism which applies
α-proportional Fairness on Dominant Shares (FDS). It
can be observed that αPF-VDS reduces to α-proportional
FDS when there exists only one server. In [2] it is shown
that sharing incentive and envy freeness properties are
not necessarily satisfied under α-proportional FDS when
α < 1. Hence, αPF-VDS may also violate sharing incen-
tive and/or envy freeness properties for α < 1.
The last property that we consider in this section is
bottleneck fairness. According to Definition 2, a resource
is considered as a bottleneck in the whole system if it is
dominantly requested by eligible users at each server.
For the resulting allocation of Problem 1, we may show
bottleneck fairness in a more general sense. Specifically,
assume that there exists one resource ρ(i) at each server i
for which the inequality in (6) is satisfied when substitut-
ing ρ with ρ(i). We refer to ρ(i) as the bottleneck resource
at server i.
Theorem 4. Assume there exists a bottleneck resource at each
server. An allocation, x, is a solution to Problem 1 if and only
if it satisfies PS-DSF.
The proof appears in the appendix. Under the condi-
tions in Theorem 4, different notions of fairness (includ-
ing different variants of αPF-VDS for gi(z) = z−α, α > 0)
coincide with PS-DSF. Hence, the resulting allocation of
Problem 1 satisfies max-min fairness with respect to the
bottleneck resource at each server [12]. The following
corollary follows directly from the proof of Theorem 4.
Corollary 1. If there exists a bottleneck resource at server i,
then the resulting allocation of Problem 1 satisfies max-min
fairness with respect to the bottleneck resource at this server.
3.4 Extensions
Non-divisible servers: Problem 1 is formulated based
on the assumption that the available resources over each
server are arbitrarily divisible. For a data-center compris-
ing of a plurality of servers, it is sometimes of practical
interest to assume that servers may not be divided to
finer partitions [19], so that each server may only be time-
shared by different users. In this case, let xn,i denote the
average number of tasks that are executed by server i
for user n per unit of time. Accordingly, xn,i/γn,i gives
the percentage of time unit that server i is allocated to
user n. Hence, we have the following condition on an
allocation, x, to be feasible [12]:∑
n∈Ni
xn,i
γn,i
≤ 1, ∀i. (17)
Theorem 5. Let gi(z) be a continuously differentiable, strictly
concave and increasing function. An allocation, x, satisfies PS-
DSF if and only if it is a solution to the following problem.
Problem 2. For every server i:
max
xi
∑
n∈Ni
φngi
(
xn
φnγn,i
)
(18)
Subject to:
∑
n∈Ni
xn,i
γn,i
≤ 1, (19)
xn,i ≥ 0, ∀n ∈ Ni, (20)
xn,i = 0, ∀n /∈ Ni. (21)
Theorem 5 implies that there exists an ideal allocation
for non-divisible servers, which results from Problem 2
for any arbitrary gi(z), provided that gi(z) is contin-
uously differentiable, strictly concave, and increasing.
In fact, different notions of fairness (including different
variants of αPF-VDS, PS-DSF (α→∞) and proportional
8fairness (α = 1)) coincide in this case. The major advan-
tage of the PS-DSF allocation mechanism (or αPF-VDS
in general) is giving a simple per-server criterion to find
such an ideal allocation [12].
Servers with heterogeneous objectives: In Section 3.2,
we chose gi(z) from the class of α-fair utility functions
with g′i(z) = z
−α, for some α that is fixed for all
servers. In general, different objectives may be followed
for resource allocation at different servers. For instance,
in a cloud computing environment, some servers may
be owned by a group of users. For such proprietary
servers, there might be more emphasis on fair allocation
of the resources among proprietors (eligible users). On
the other hand, there might be some public servers
for which there might be more emphasis on efficient
allocation of the resources.
To address this issue, one may choose gi(z) from
the class of α-fair utility functions, but (possibly) with
different αi for different servers. In this case, we may
extend all the results shown in Theorem 1-3. In particular,
we may extend the definition of αPF-VDS, so that the
resulting allocation of Problem 1 satisfies the inequality
in (16), where we consider different αi for different
servers. Also, it can be observed that the resulting al-
location of Problem 1 satisfies PS-DSF with respect to
each server i as αi → ∞ (see proof of Theorem 2 in
the appendix). Furthermore, careful inspection of the
proof of Theorem 3 indicates that the resulting allocation
of Problem 1 in such a heterogeneous setting satisfies
sharing incentive and envy freeness properties, provided
that αi ≥ 1, ∀i.
Finally, we introduce a broader class of utility func-
tions which includes the class of α-fair utility functions.
Specifically, consider gi(z) such that:
g′i(z) =
(
Ai
z
)αi
+
Bi
z
, (22)
where Ai, Bi ≥ 0, and αi > 0. For this class of utility
functions, we can show uniqueness of the solution to
Problem 1 (in terms of {xn}), when Bi > 0 (see Sec-
tion 4.4). Again, the trade-off between efficiency and
fairness can be adjusted by αi. Furthermore, we may
extend Theorem 3 to show envy freeness and sharing
incentive properties for this class of utility functions.
Corollary 2. The resulting allocation of Problem 1 satisfies
sharing incentive and envy-freeness properties, provided that
gi(z) is from the class of functions in (22), and αi ≥ 1.
Corollary 3. Let gi(z) be from the class of utility functions
specified by (22). The resulting allocation of Problem 1 satisfies
PS-DSF with respect to server i as αi → ∞, provided that
s˜n,i/Ai ≤ 1, ∀n.
The proofs appear in the appendix.
4 TOWARDS A SOLUTION TO PROBLEM 1: AN
EQUIVALENT FORMULATION
In this section, we reformulate Problem 1 as a nonlinear
complementary problem. This equivalent formulation
forms the basis to develop an iterative algorithm to solve
this problem in the next section.
4.1 Formulation as a non-linear complementary
problem
For Problem 1 describing a concave game, it is well
known that x is a solution (Nash equilibrium) if and
only if there exists a set of multipliers, λ and ν, such
that KKT conditions are satisfied6 [28]:
0 ≤ λi,r ⊥ (ci,r −
∑
n∈Ni
xn,idn,r) ≥ 0, ∀r, i, (23)
0 ≤ νn,i ⊥ xn,i ≥ 0, n ∈ Ni, ∀i, (24)
∂Li(x, λ, ν)
∂xn,i
= 0, n ∈ Ni, ∀i, (25)
where, Li(x, λ, ν) is the Lagrangian function for the local
problem at server i,
Li(x, λ, ν) :=
∑
n∈Ni
[
φngi
(
xn
φnγn,i
)
+ νn,ixn,i
]
+
∑
r
λi,r(ci,r −
∑
n∈Ni
xn,idn,r). (26)
Hence, the first order optimality condition in (25) implies
that:
1
γn,i
g′i
(
xn
φnγn,i
)
−
∑
r
λi,rdn,r + νn,i = 0, n ∈ Ni, ∀i. (27)
We may solve the system of KKT conditions in (23)-
(25) for νn,i, and reach the following simplified set of
conditions:
0 ≤ λi,r ⊥ fi,r(xi) ≥ 0, ∀r, i, (28)
0 ≤ xn,i ⊥ fn,i(x, λi) ≥ 0, n ∈ Ni, ∀i, (29)
where,
fi,r(xi) := ci,r −
∑
n∈Ni
xn,idn,r, (30)
fn,i(x, λi) :=
∑
r
λi,rdn,r − 1
γn,i
g′i
(
xn
φnγn,i
)
. (31)
The problem of finding (x, λ), such that the comple-
mentary conditions in (28)-(29) are satisfied, is known
as a Non-linear Complementary Problem (NCP). A brief
introduction to this family of problems is given in the
next subsection.
6. Conditions of the form 0 ≤ x ⊥ y ≥ 0 are referred to as
complementary conditions, where x ⊥ y means that xy = 0.
94.2 Background on nonlinear complementary prob-
lems
Let F(z) be a continuously differentiable function (map-
ping), F : Rm → Rm. The nonlinear complementary
problem, NCP(F), is to find z ∈ Rm such that:
0 ≤ z,F(z) ≥ 0, zTF(z) = 0, (32)
where the inequalities are taken componentwise. This
problem can be best described by introducing a comple-
mentary function. Specifically, ψ : R2 → R is said to be a
complementary function when [29]:
ψ(a, b) = 0 ⇔ a ≥ 0, b ≥ 0, and ab = 0. (33)
Based on a complementary function, NCP(F) can be
reformulated as:
ψ(zl, Fl(z)) = 0, ∀l. (34)
Several complementary functions have been proposed
in the literature [30], but the most prominent one is the
Fischer-Burmeister function [29]:
ψFB(a, b) :=
√
a2 + b2 − a− b. (35)
Here we use the following complementary function [30]:
ψ(a, b) =
1
2
ψ2FB(a, b), (36)
which is continuously differentiable, and ψ(a, b) ≥ 0,
∀(a, b) ∈ R2.
4.3 A constrained merit function
In order to solve the NCP described by (28)-(29), we con-
fine the feasible region such that (28) is always satisfied.
Lemma 1. (x, λ) is a solution to the NCP described by (28)-
(29), if and only if it is a solution to the following problem.
Problem 3.
min Ψ(x, λ) :=
∑
i∈K
∑
n∈Ni
ψ(xn,i, fn,i(x, λi)), (37)
s.t.
∑
n∈Ni
xn,idn,r ≤ ci,r, ∀r, i, (38)
λi,r ≥ 0, r ∈ Ri(x),∀i, (39)
λi,r = 0, r /∈ Ri(x),∀i. (40)
where, Ri(x) := {r |
∑
n∈Ni xn,idn,r = ci,r} denotes the set
of saturated resources at server i under the allocation x.
Proof: The constraints in (38)-(40) are established if
and only if (x, λ) satisfies (28). According to (33), the
complementary conditions in (29) are satisfied if and only
if ψ(xn,i, fn,i(x, λi)) = 0, n ∈ Ni, ∀i. On the other hand
(36) implies that ψ(·, ·) has a lower bound of zero. Hence,
a feasible point (x, λ) is a solution to Problem 3 if and
only if (29) is satisfied for all n ∈ Ni, ∀i.
The following theorem, proven in the appendix, sug-
gests how to find global minima for Problem 3.
Theorem 6. A feasible point, (x, λ), satisfying the conditions
in (38)-(40), is a solution to Problem 3 if and only if it is a
stationary point of Ψ(x, λ) in (37), i.e., ∇Ψ(x, λ) = 0.
4.4 Structure of the solution
In this section, we investigate the structure of the solu-
tion set for Problem 1, or the equivalent NCP described
by Problem 3, when gi(·) is specified by (22) and αi ≥
1, ∀i. In Problem 1, the feasible region for x, described
by (13)-(15), is a bounded region. As we showed in
Section 3.3, the solution to this problem satisfies sharing
incentive property. That is,
xn ≥ ψn∑
m φm
∑
i
γn,i =: x
min
n , ∀n. (41)
For the equivalent NCP described by (28)-(29), it can
also be shown that the solution (x, λ) is contained
within a bounded region. To observe boundedness of
Lagrange multipliers for each server i, consider some
user n for which xn,idn,r > 0, for some resource r.
From the complementary condition in (29), it follows that
fn,i(x, λi) = 0, and therefore,∑
r
λi,rdn,r =
1
γn,i
g′i
(
xn
φnγn,i
)
. (42)
Since gi(·) is a concave function, the lower bound in (41)
implies that:∑
r
λi,rdn,r ≤ 1
γn,i
g′i
(
xminn
φnγn,i
)
<∞, (43)
which clearly shows boundedness of Lagrange multipli-
ers for server i.
Lemma 2. The solution set for the NCP described by (28)-
(29), or equivalently Problem 3, is connected.
Proof: For Problem 3 we know that: (a) if (x, λ) is
a solution, then ∇Ψ(x, λ) = 0 (c.f. Theorem 6), (b) the
function Ψ(x, λ), Ψ : R(N+M)K 7→ R, is continuously
differentiable, and (c) the solutions are contained within
a bounded region. Given these conditions, the proofs for
Lemma 3.1, and Corollary 3.5 of [31] can be applied to
show connectedness of the solution set for this problem.
The following result, borrowed from [31], is a direct
consequence of Lemma 2.
Corollary 4. Problem 3 has a unique solution if and only if
it has a locally unique solution [31].
In the same way, it can be observed that Problem 3 has
a unique solution in terms of the total allocated tasks to
each user, provided that it has a locally unique solution
in terms of {xn}. In the following we draw conditions
under which the optimal solution to Problem 3 will be
locally unique in terms of {xn}.
Theorem 7. Let (x, λ) denote an optimal solution to Prob-
lem 3, when gi(·) is from the class of functions specified in
(22), and αi ≥ 1, Ai ≥ 0 and Bi > 0. If λi,r > 0 only for one
resource at each server i, then (x, λ) will be locally unique in
terms of the total allocated tasks to each user, {xn}.
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5 ITERATIVE SOLUTION AND DISTRIBUTED IM-
PLEMENTATION
In this section, we first develop an iterative (centralized)
algorithm that is globally convergent to an optimal so-
lution (Nash equilibrium) to Problem 1. Next, we will
propose a simple heuristic to solve this problem in a
distributed fashion.
5.1 Centralized solution
As discussed in Section 4, x is a solution to Problem 1,
if and only if there exists a set of multipliers such that
(x, λ) is a solution to Problem 3. According to Theorem 6,
in order to find a solution to Problem 3, we may employ
an iterative descent algorithm which converges to a
stationary point where ∇Ψ(x, λ) = 0. In the following,
we propose an iterative algorithm inspired by projected-
gradient method.
Initially, we begin with a feasible point, (x1, λ1), which
satisfies (38)-(40). Then, in each iteration h ≥ 1, we
update (xh, λh) such that Ψ(xh+1, λh+1) is decreased
compared to Ψ(xh, λh), while (xh+1, λh+1) remains fea-
sible. Specifically, let Rhi denote the set of saturated
resources at server i under the allocation xh,
Rhi := {r |
∑
n∈Ni
xhn,idn,r = ci,r}. (44)
The opposite of gradient, −∇Ψ(xh, λh), is a descent
direction. However, by moving xh in the direction of
−∇xΨ(xh, λh), the capacity constraint would be violated
for resource r ∈ Rhi if:
βhi,r := −(∇xiΨ(xh, λh))Tdr > 0, (45)
where dr := [dn,r]N×1, and ∇xiΨ is the gradient of
Ψ with respect to xi. So, the moving direction should
be chosen in a way that the capacity constraints are
not violated for any resource r ∈ Rhi . Furthermore, to
reach a feasible point satisfying (40), we need to preserve
equality for the capacity constraints corresponding to
resources r ∈ Rhi with λhi,r > 0. Hence, we choose the
moving direction for updating xhi , (v
h
x)i, as the projection
of −∇xiΨ(xh, λh) onto:
Ωi := {v ∈ RN | vTdr ≤ 0, r ∈ Rhi : λi,r = 0,
and vTdr = 0, r ∈ Rhi : λi,r > 0}. (46)
To update λhi,r, the following is a descent direction
7:
(v˜hλ)i,r := −
∂Ψ
∂λi,r
+ βhi,r U
(
−βhi,r
∂Ψ
∂λi,r
)
. (47)
However, to maintain feasibility, we need to choose the
moving direction (vhλ)i,r such that:
(vhλ)i,r := [(v˜
h
λ)i,r]
+
λi,r
, (48)
7. The function U(·) is U(z) = 1 if z ≥ 0, and U(z) = 0 otherwise.
Algorithm I: PS-MFA Algorithm
Initially, begin with a feasible point (x1, λ1) satisfying (38)-(40).
Then, in each iteration h ≥ 1, take the following steps.
1) Choose the moving direction for xi, as the projection of
−∇xiΨ(xh, λh) onto Ωi,
(vhx)i = ProjΩi (−∇xiΨ(x
h, λh)), (54)
where Ωi is given by (46).
2) Choose the moving direction for λi,r according to (48).
3) Choose the step size, ηh, sufficiently small, so that the
conditions in (51)-(53) are satisfied.
4) Let xh+1 = xh + ηhvhx , and λh+1 = λh + ηhvhλ.
5) Stop when ‖vh‖ ≤ ε, where vh = [vhx ;vhλ].
where, [v]+z = v if z > 0, and otherwise [v]+z = max{v, 0}.
Finally, we update
xh+1 = xh + ηhvhx, (49)
λh+1 = λh + ηhvhλ, (50)
where, the step size ηh is chosen such that:
Ψ(xh+1, λh+1)−Ψ(xh, λh) < 0, (51)∑
n∈Ni
xh+1n,i dn,r ≤ ci,r, ∀r, i, (52)
λh+1i,r ≥ 0, ∀r, i. (53)
The algorithm terminates when ‖vh‖ < , for some
arbitrary  > 0. The above described algorithm, referred
to as Per-Server Multi-resource Fair Allocation (PS-MFA)
algorithm has been summarized in Algorithm I.
Lemma 3. The moving direction, vh = [vhx;vhλ], is a strictly
descent direction, unless ‖vh‖ = 0.
The proof appears in the appendix. To further analyze
the convergence point of the PS-MFA algorithm, we need
to make one of the following assumptions.
Assumption 1. The PS-MFA algorithm terminates at a point
where λi,r > 0 for every r ∈ Ri, ∀i.
Assumption 2. For every server i and resource r there exists
at least one user n /∈ Ni with dn,r > 0.
Assumption 1 requires that the algorithm terminates
at a non-degenerate point, where λi,r > 0 for every r ∈ Ri.
Assumption 2 does not restrict the solution, but it gently
restricts the model. In particular, it holds when all users
demand all types of resources, and there exists one user
n /∈ Ni for each server i.
Lemma 4. Under either of Assumptions 1 or 2, vh = 0 only
when ∇xΨ = 0 (the proof is given in the appendix).
Theorem 8. The PS-MFA algorithm terminates at a station-
ary point of Ψ under either of Assumptions 1 or 2.
Proof: The facts that Ψ is lower bounded and
vh is a descent direction imply that the algorithm
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converges/terminates. When the algorithm terminates,
‖vh‖ → 0, and therefore ∇xΨ = 0 (see Lemma 4). This
in turn implies that ψ(xn,i, fn,i(x, λi)) = 0, ∀n, i (see the
proof of Theorem 6), and therefore ∇Ψ = 0.
According to Theorem 6 and 8, the sequence of alloca-
tions {xh} generated by the PS-MFA algorithm globally
converges to an optimal solution to Problem 1 under
either of Assumption 1 or 2.
5.2 Distributed implementation
The PS-MFA algorithm, as described by Algorithm I, may
run in parallel on different servers, where each server
iteratively updates its own allocation parameters, (xi, λi).
However, to find the gradient vector at each server i, one
needs to know the allocation parameters at the other
servers. To achieve an efficient distributed implemen-
tation, we propose a simple heuristic algorithm which
directly applies to the NCP in (28)-(29). First, assume that
the Lagrange multipliers, {λi,r}, are known, so that the
complementary conditions in (28) are satisfied. Starting
with a feasible allocation x1, in each iteration h ≥ 1, one
may update xhn,i in the following direction:
vhn,i =
[−fn,i(xh, λ)]+xhn,i , n ∈ Ni, ∀i, (55)
xh+1n,i =
[
xhn,i + κiv
h
n,i
]+
, (56)
where, [v]+z = v if z > 0, and otherwise [v]+z = max{v, 0}.
The step size, κi > 0, is chosen independently by each
server. According to (55) and (56), xhn,i is decreased if
it is positive and fn,i(xh, λi) > 0. Otherwise, it will be
increased when fn,i(xh, λi) < 0. The above dynamic con-
verges/terminates when the complementary conditions
in (29) are satisfied. The only issue is to find the Lagrange
multipliers. As also can be seen in [27], the Lagrange
multipliers could be approximated by:
λi,r(x
h) =
[∑
m
xhm,idm,r − ci,r + ε
]+
/ε2, (57)
where a better approximation is achieved when ε → 08.
The major advantage of the above dynamic is that the
allocation at each server could be updated based on
the local information on the available resources at each
server, without any knowledge of the available resources
at other servers. The only information that each server
requires is the total number of tasks that are allocated to
eligible users, which is assumed to be updated whenever
an update is made by any of the servers. The conver-
gence of such a heuristic algorithm is shown through
numerical experiments in the next section.
8. This is equivalent to relaxing the capacity constraint in (13)
for every resource r, and adding a quadratic barrier function,(∑
m xm,idm,r − ci,r + ε
)2
/2ε2, to the objective function in (12).
6 TRACE DRIVEN SIMULATION
In this section we evaluate the performance of the αPF-
VDS allocation mechanism through several experiments
driven by real-world traces. Among the publicly avail-
able traces, Google cluster-usage data-set is the most
extensive one which reports the resource usage for dif-
ferent tasks of different users (Google engineers and
services) running on a cluster of 12000 servers over a
period of one month. The resource usage for each task
has been measured at 1 second intervals, however, its
average value is reported in the data-set with a period
of 5 minutes. If a task is terminated during the five
minutes period, its resource usage is reported over a
shorter interval. Specifically, the data-set is given in a
table format where each row reports the start and the
end of each measurement period (which is typically 5
minutes), the job ID and task index, and finally the usage
of CPU and RAM for the specified task. The reader
may refer to [32] for further details. Despite the detailed
information that is provided by this data-set, it does not
report the usage of other resources such as network/IO
bandwidth.
To do experiments with resource demand vectors of
higher dimensionality, we also use a data-set provided
by Bitbrain IT services incorporation which gives cloud
service to users with business-critical workloads [33].
This data-set reports the resource usage (of CPU, RAM,
network and storage bandwidth) for different virtual
machines each giving service to one user. Again, the
measurements have been reported every 5 minutes for
a period of 4 months. There are only a few other traces
which are publicly available (such as those from Yahoo
or Facebook). However, we do not use such traces herein
as they do not provide the information that we need on
the usage of different resources. Furthermore, some of
them pertain to specific processing tasks, such as Map-
reduce, which may not represent the input to a real world
data-center [33].
6.1 Experimental setup
To do experiments with Google traces, we consider a
cluster consisting of four different classes of servers
(120 servers in total as shown in Fig. 4), where the
configuration of servers are drawn from the distribution
of Google cluster servers [32]. For the input workload,
we randomly sample 2% of users from the Google traces,
so that the cluster is heavily loaded. The jobs for different
users belong to 4 different scheduling classes (specified
in a table for different jobs), where the last two classes are
more latency sensitive. We classify users/jobs9 into two
different groups, U1 and U2, where the users in U1 are less
latency sensitive. Servers in classes A and B are assumed
to be public (available to all users), while classes C and
D are only available to delay sensitive users, U2.
9. While each user in practice may submit several jobs at the same
time, for the sake of simplicity in presentation we assume that each user
only submits one job. So, we may use jobs or users interchangeably.
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Fig. 4: A cluster with four classes of servers (120 servers in total)
and two classes of users. Users are assumed to be equally weighted.
The configurations of resources (CPU and memory respectively) for
servers of each class are as follows: CA = [1, 1], CB = [0.5, 0.5], CC =
[0.5, 0.25], CD = [0.5, 0.75], where CPU and memory units for each
server are normalized with respect to the servers of the first class.
To do experiments with the Bitbrain data-set, first we
need to choose a set of servers from which the resources
are allocated to different users. For this purpose, we find
the overall resource usage by active users at different
instants of time, so we provide enough capacity of each
resource to meet the maximum overall usage. It is worth
noting that users demand resources to meet their maxi-
mum usage. Hence, the overall demands might be more
than the overall resource usages at any of instant of time.
Given the required resource capacities, we assume that
CPU and RAM resources are provided by three types
of servers, where there are 75 servers of type 1 with
4 GHz of CPU and 12 GBytes of RAM, 100 servers of
type 2 with 8 GHz of CPU and 8 GBytes of RAM, and
75 servers of type 3 with 16 GHz of CPU and 4 GBytes
of RAM. It is assumed that servers are distributed over
3 different locations as shown in Fig. 5. Each type of
servers at each location is connected to a storage device
and also is equipped with a network connection (see
Fig. 5). It is assumed that users are uniformly distributed
over different locations. Each user may get service from
the servers at the same, or nearby location.
6.2 Adjusting the resource utilization
As discussed in Section 3.2 and shown by an illustrative
example in Fig. 3, the resource utilization is improved as
the parameter α in the αPF-VDS allocation mechanism
reduces. In this subsection we study this effect when
applying this mechanism to real-world workloads.
In the Bitbrain workload, users become
active/incactive with a low churn. So, the resources
could be allocated to different users/virtual-machines
in a semi-static manner. In this case, we do several
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Fig. 5: A data-center distributed over three different locations. There
are three types of servers, where the configuration of resources (CPU
and memory respectively) for each type of server is as follows: (4 GHz,
12 GBytes) for type 1, (8 GHz, 8 GBytes) for type 2, (16 GHz, 4 GBytes)
for type 3. The storage devices are of two different types, where the
read/write bandwidth for type 1, used at the first and the last locations,
is 32 MB/s, and for type 2, used at the second location, is 100 MB/s.
Finally, there are two types of broadband connections, where the first
type provides a bandwidth of 100 Mb/s (and 1 Gb/s respectively) to
send (receive) data, while the second type provides a bandwidth of
1 Gb/s (and 2 Gb/s respectively) to send (receive) data.
experiments for different sets of active users chosen at
random instants of time. In particular, for each set of
active users we find the αPF-VDS allocation for α = 1,
α = 3 and α = ∞. In case of α = 1 and α = 3 we
employ the distributed iterative algorithm proposed
in Section 5.2. For α = ∞, we employ the customized
algorithm proposed in [12] to implement PS-DSF.
Fig. 6 shows how our proposed distributed algorithm
converges to an optimal solution to Problem 3 where
Ψ(x, λ) = 0. In Fig. 7 we report the overall resource
utilization that is achieved on average over different
servers and over 100 runs, for different variants of
αPF-VDS. As expected, the αPF-VDS results in a greater
utilization of different resources for smaller values of
α. The improvement in utilization could be significant
when α ranges from ∞ to 1.
For the Google workload, we allocate resources in a
(semi)dynamic manner. In particular, consider the com-
puting cluster in Fig. 4, where 2% of users from the
Google traces are randomly chosen as the input work-
load. In such a setting, we (re)allocate resources from
the servers to demanding jobs (at least) every 5 minutes.
Specifically, given the resource usage for different tasks
of each job by the Google traces, we may find the
demand vector for each job (at the beginning of each
13
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Fig. 6: The convergence of the proposed distributed algorithm to find
the αPF-VDS allocation for the computing cluster in Fig. 5 when α = 3.
The algorithm shows a linear convergence.
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Fig. 7: The overall resource utilization, averaged over different servers
and over differen runs, for different variants of αPF-VDS: α = 1
(proportional fairness), α = 3, α =∞ (PS-DSF).
5 minutes interval) as the summation of the resource
usage for different tasks (different tasks of the same
job usually have proportional demands [32]). Given the
total demand for each job, dn = [dn,r], we define a
quantum for job n as a block of resources in the amount
of d˜n := dn/maxr dm,r that is allocated to job n for
1 second. Accordingly, job n requires qn := 300 maxr dm,r
execution quanta for the next 5 minutes interval. We use
the normalized demand vectors, {d˜n}, as the input to
the αPF-VDS mechanism in order to find the number of
tasks that are allocated to each job under this mechanism.
Given the allocated tasks to each job, the completion time
for job n is given by qn/xn. If a job completes/leaves
the system during the 5 minutes period, the released
resources are reallocated among the remaining jobs.
The required execution quanta for different jobs, and
also their activity duration, span a very wide range.
Fig. 8 plots the cumulative density function (CDF) of
the activity duration (in terms of the number of 5 min
intervals) and also the CDF of the required quanta for
different jobs in the Google traces over an interval of 24
hours. As can be seen in Fig. 8, around 38% of jobs are
completed within a 5 min period, while 16% of them are
active more than 24 hours. Moreover, 53% of jobs require
less than 10 execution quanta, while 5% of them require
more then 10000 quanta. The variety of jobs and the
existence of such intensive ones indicate the necessity for
an efficient and fair allocation mechanism, which from
one hand prevents intensive jobs starving others, and on
the other hand results in an efficient resource utilization.
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Fig. 8: The CDF of the activity duration and the required quanta for
different jobs over an interval of 24 hours.
Fig. 9 compares the overall resource utilization (aver-
aged over different servers) that is achieved on average
over an interval of one hour, when allocating resources
using different variants of αPF-VDS. Again, it can be
observed that the proportional fair allocation (α = 1)
results in a greater resource utilization, while the PS-DSF
allocation (α = ∞) is less efficient compared to other
variants. It is worth noting that the achieved increase in
utilization for smaller values of α comes at the price of
compromising on fairness. Intuitively, PS-DSF strives to
balance the (weighted) VDS for all users with xn,i > 0, at
each server i. Specifically, the PS-DSF allocation results in
s˜n,i = minm s˜m,i, for all users with xn,i > 0, ∀i, provided
that dn,r > 0, ∀n, r. For an arbitrary allocation x, we
define:
Dn(x) :=
∑
i
xn,i
xn
(
s˜n,i −minm s˜m,i
minm s˜m,i
)
, (58)
as a measure for deviation of each user n from the fair
allocation (given by PS-DSF). In Fig. 10 we report the
average deviation,
∑
n φnDn(x)/
∑
n φn, and also the
maximum deviation among different users, maxnDn(x),
for our previous experiment in Fig. 9. It can be observed
that a larger deviation is experienced for smaller values
of α. This in turn results in variations in the quality of
service (e.g. per-quantum delay) experienced by different
jobs. In Fig. 11 we report the average per-quantum delay
and its standard deviation which are experienced by
short-duration jobs (those requiring less than one execu-
tion quantum) under different variants of the αPF-VDS
mechanism. Again a larger deviation is experienced for
smaller values of α.
6.3 Comparison with existing mechanisms
In this subsection, we compare our proposed multi-
resource allocation mechanism in terms of resource uti-
lization against the existing multi-resource allocation
mechanisms. Specifically, we compare the PS-DSF al-
location (which is the least efficient variant of αPF-
VDS), against the DRFH and TSF allocation mechanisms
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Fig. 9: The overall resource utilization that is achieved (on average)
over different servers during a 1 hour period, when allocating resources
using αPF-VDS with: α = 1 (proportional fairness), α = 3, α =∞ (PS-
DSF).
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mechanism.
D
el
ay
 (s
ec
)
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
, = 1 , = 3 , = 1
Fig. 11: The average and the standard deviation of the per-quantum
delay under different variants of the αPF-VDS allocation mechanism.
(which all are applicable to heterogeneous servers in
the presence of placement constraints). First, consider
the computing cluster in Fig. 5 feeded by the Bitbrain
workload. We employ each of the aforementioned mech-
anisms to allocate resources of the servers in Fig. 5 to
different sets of active users chosen at random instants
of time. The overall utilization that is achieved by of each
of these mechanisms for different resources, is shown in
Fig. 12, when averaged over different servers and over
100 runs. It cane be observed that the PS-DSF allocation
mechanism outperforms the two other mechanisms in
terms of the achieved utilization for different resources.
In particular, the resource utilization is enhanced by the
PS-DSF mechanism for up to 20% for some resources.
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We make similar observations with the Google traces.
Specifically, consider again the computing cluster in
Fig. 4, where 2% of jobs in the Google traces are ran-
domly chosen as the input workload. We employ each of
the PS-DSF, DRFH and TSF allocation mechanisms to al-
locate resources of the servers in Fig. 4 to demanding jobs
over an interval of 24 hours. Fig. 13 compares the over-
all resource utilization (averaged over different servers)
that is achieved by different allocation mechanisms. It
can be observed that PS-DSF is again more efficient in
utilizing different resources, compared to the DRFH and
TSF allocation mechanisms, while the achieved resource
utilization by DRFH and TSF mechanisms is almost the
same10. The overall resource utilization that is achieved
on average over the 24 hour period is shown in Fig. 14 for
different allocation mechanisms. The resource utilization
over the last two classes of servers is also shown in
Fig. 14. It can be observed that the PS-DSF allocation
improves the resource utilization over the last two classes
of servers more significantly.
Intuitively, the PS-DSF allocation mechanism allocates
resources at each server based on the per-server virtual
dominant shares. So, at each server it gives more priority
to users which may run more tasks (c.f. (9)). Hence, one
may expect that the PS-DSF allocation mechanism results
in a greater resource utilization compared to the DRFH
and TSF mechanisms, especially when the resources
are heterogeneously distributed over different servers.
That is the reason why a more significant increase in
utilization is achieved by the PS-DSF allocation over the
last two classes of servers, where the resources are more
heterogeneously distributed (the available resources over
the first two classes of servers in Fig. 4 are almost pro-
portional to the overall resource capacities). This is also
consistent with our observation in the first experiment
(with the Bitbrain workload), where the variety of re-
10. DRFH is just the extension of DRF for multiple heterogeneous
servers. There are also other mechanisms, such as those in [18], which
approximate DRFH. As their utilization is the same as, or inferior to
the DRFH allocation, we do not consider them herein.
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sources along with the heterogeneity of servers results in
a significant outperformance by the PS-DSF mechanism.
7 CONCLUSION
We studied efficient and fair allocation of multiple types
of resources in an environment of heterogeneous servers
in the presence of placement constraints. We identified
potential limitations in the existing multi-resource allo-
cation mechanisms, DRF and its follow up work, when
used in such environments. In certain occasions, they
may not succeed in satisfying all of the essential fairness-
related properties, may not readily be implementable in a
distributed fashion, and may lead to inefficient resource
utilization. We proposed a new server-based approach
to efficiently allocate resources while capturing server
heterogeneity. We showed how our proposed mechanism
could be parameterized (by α) to adjust the trade-off
between efficiency and fairness. Our resource allocation
mechanism was shown to satisfy all of the essential
fairness-related properties, i.e., sharing incentive, envy-
freeness and bottleneck fairness, for every α ≥ 1, and
Pareto optimality for the case α = 1. The amenability to
distributed implementation usually comes at the price of
degrading the performance. Our proposed mechanism
not only is amenable to distributed implementation, but
also results in an enhanced resource utilization compared
to the existing mechanisms. We carried out extensive
simulations, driven by real-world traces, to demonstrate
the performance improvements of our resource alloca-
tion mechanism.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 1: With g′i(z) = z
−α, the partial
derivative of Ui(x) in (12) with respect to xn,i,
∂Ui(x)
∂xn,i
=
g′i(s˜n,i)
γn,i
=
1
γn,i s˜αn,i
, n ∈ Ni, ∀i, (59)
and ∂Ui/∂xn,i = 0 if n /∈ Ni. Hence,
∇xiUi(x)T (yi − xi) =
∑
n∈Ni
(yn,i − xn,i)/γn,i
s˜αn,i
. (60)
In case that x is a solution to Problem 1, the inequality
in (16) follows directly from the first order optimality
condition. Specifically,∑
n∈Ni
(yn,i − xn,i)/γn,i
s˜αn,i
= ∇xiUi(x)T (yi − xi) ≤ 0, (61)
for every feasible yi = [yn,i], and for all servers. Now
assume that (16) is established for a feasible allocation x.
The equality in (60) implies that ∇xiUi(x)T (yi−xi) ≤ 0.
This along with concavity of Ui(x) in terms of xi imply
that:
Ui(yi,x−i) ≤ Ui(xi,x−i) +∇xiUi(x)T (yi − xi)
≤ Ui(xi,x−i),
for every feasible yi, and for all servers. This in turn im-
plies that x is a solution (Nash equilibrium) to Problem 1.
Proof of Theorem 2: For α = 1, we may sum (16)
over different servers. Then, for every feasible allocation
y: ∑
n
φn
yn − xn
xn
≤ 0, (62)
which implies that x satisfies (weighted) proportional
fairness. In case that α→∞, the proof would be similar
to that for Lemma 5 in [25]. Let x(α) denote an allocation
satisfying αPF-VDS. Since the feasible region, described
by (13)-(15), is a compact set, we can find a sequence
of α, {αl, l ≥ 1}, such that liml→∞ αl = ∞ and {x(αl)}
converges to some feasible x(∞) as l→∞. By definition,
if x(αl) satisfies αPF-VDS, then for every server i and for
all feasible allocations, yi,∑
m∈Ni
(ym,i − xm,i)
γm,i[s˜m,i(αl)]αl
≤ 0,
where s˜m,i(αl) := xm(αl)/φmγm,i is the weighted VDS
for user m with respect to server i. Consider an arbitrary
user n and server i for which yn,i 6= xn,i. It follows that:
∆n,i :=
(yn,i − xn,i)
γn,i[s˜n,i(αl)]αl
≤ −
∑
m6=n, m∈Ni
(ym,i − xm,i)
γm,i[s˜m,i(αl)]αl
,
Dividing both sides of the above inequality by ∆n,i 6= 0,
1 ≤
∑
m 6=n, m∈Ni
hm,i
[
s˜n,i(αl)
s˜m,i(αl)
]αl
≤
∑
m 6=n, hm,i>0
hm,i
[
s˜n,i(αl)
s˜m,i(αl)
]αl
, (63)
where hm,i := −γn,i(ym,i−xm,i)γm,i(yn,i−xn,i) <∞.
Unless there exists some user p with hp,i > 0 and
s˜p,i(∞) ≤ s˜n,i(∞), the right hand side of (63) approaches
zero as αl → ∞. Hence, for the inequality in (63) to
hold, there must exist some user p with hp,i > 0 such
that s˜p,i(∞) ≤ s˜n,i(∞). Note that hp,i > 0 implies
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that if yn,i > xn,i(∞), then yp,i < xp,i(∞). In other
words, for any feasible allocation y 6= x(∞), we may
not increase the allocated tasks to user n from server
i, yn,i > xn,i(∞), unless decreasing the allocated tasks
from server i, yp,i < xp,i(∞), for some user p with
s˜p,i(∞) ≤ s˜n,i(∞). This implies that x(∞) satisfies PS-
DSF.
Proof of Theorem 3: For α = 1, the αPF-VDS
allocation reduces to a proportional fair allocation, max-
imizing a global objective,
∑
n φn log(xn). So, the resulting
allocation is Pareto optimal. To prove sharing incentive
and envy freeness properties, first we need to derive
some inequalities.
As in Section 4, let λi,r, and νn,i, denote the Lagrange
multipliers corresponding to the constraints in (13), and
(14), respectively. Given the Lagrange multipliers, the
KKT conditions for Problem 1 are described by (23)-(25).
Specifically, the first order optimality condition in (25)
implies that:
γ−1n,ig
′
i(s˜n,i)−
∑
r
λi,rdn,r + νn,i = 0, n ∈ Ni, ∀i, (64)
where s˜n,i = xn/φnγn,i. Since νn,i ≥ 0,
γ−1n,ig
′
i(s˜n,i) ≤
∑
r
λi,rdn,r, n ∈ Ni, ∀i. (65)
By definition, γn,i = minr{ci,r/dn,r}. Hence,
g′i(s˜n,i) ≤
∑
r
λi,rγn,idn,r ≤
∑
r
λi,rci,r, n ∈ Ni, ∀i. (66)
Multiplying both sides of (64) by xn,i, and summing
over different users:∑
n∈Ni
xn,i
γn,i
g′i(s˜n,i) =
∑
n∈Ni
[∑
r
λi,rxn,idn,r + xn,iνn,i
]
=
∑
r
∑
n∈Ni
λi,rxn,idn,r, ∀i, (67)
where the second equality follows from the fact that
xn,iνn,i = 0, n ∈ Ni, ∀i (c.f. (24)). Moreover, the
complementary condition in (23) implies that:∑
r
∑
n∈Ni
λi,rxn,idn,r =
∑
r
λi,rci,r, ∀i. (68)
From (66), (67) and (68) it follows that:
g′i(s˜n,i) ≤
∑
m∈Ni
xm,i
γm,i
g′i(s˜m,i), n ∈ Ni, ∀i. (69)
Now, we are ready to prove the sharing incentive
property. Let n∗i := arg minn s˜n,i, and multiply both sides
of the inequality in (69) for server i and user n∗i by
(s˜n∗i ,i)
α−1. For g′i(z) = z
−α and α ≥ 1, it follows that:
(s˜n∗i ,i)
−1 ≤
∑
m∈Ni
φm
xm,i
xm
[
s˜n∗i ,i
s˜m,i
]α−1
≤
∑
m∈N
φm
xm,i
xm
, ∀i, (70)
where the second inequality follows from the facts that
s˜n∗i ,i ≤ s˜m,i, ∀m, and xm,i = 0, n /∈ Ni. Furthermore,
(s˜n,i)
−1 ≤ (s˜n∗i ,i)−1 ≤
∑
m
φm
xm,i
xm
, ∀n, i. (71)
Summing (71) over different servers,
φn
xn
∑
i
γn,i ≤
∑
m
∑
i
φm
xm,i
xm
=
∑
m
φm, (72)
or,
xn ≥ φn∑
m φm
∑
i
γn,i. (73)
To show envy freeness, (by contradiction) assume that
user n envies user m’s allocation vector, when adjusted
according to their weights. That is, Un( φnφm am) > Un(an),
where am = xmdm and an = xndn. It follows that
(c.f. (1)):
xndn,r
φn
<
xmdm,r
φm
, ∀r. (74)
Consider some server j for which xm,j > 0, so that νm,j =
0. Then, (64) implies that:∑
r
λj,rdm,r = γ
−1
m,jg
′
j(s˜m,j). (75)
If we multiply both sides of (65) by xn/φn, then it follows
from (74) and (75) that:
s˜n,jg
′
j(s˜n,j) ≤
∑
r
λj,rdn,rxn
φn
<
∑
r
λj,rdm,rxm
φm
= s˜m,jg
′
j(s˜m,j) (76)
In case that g′j(z) = z
−α and α > 1, it follows from (76)
that s˜n,j > s˜m,j , and therefore,
xndn,ρ(n,j)
φncj,ρ(n,j)
=
xn
φnγn,j
>
xm
φmγm,j
≥ xmdm,r
φmcj,r
, ∀r, (77)
which contradicts (74) for r = ρ(n, j). In case that g′j(z) =
z−1, (76) requires that 1 < 1, which is a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 4: A resource, say ρ(i), is
identified as a bottleneck resource at server i, if it is
dominantly requested by all eligible users for server i.
That is ρ(n, i) = ρ(i), n ∈ Ni. Hence,∑
n∈Ni
xn,i
dn,r
ci,r
≤
∑
n∈Ni
xn,i
dn,ρ(i)
ci,ρ(i)
=
∑
n∈Ni
xn,i
γn,i
, ∀i, r. (78)
The above inequality implies that all of the capacity
constraints for server i could be replaced by:∑
n∈Ni
xn,i
γn,i
≤ 1. (79)
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Let λi denote the Lagrange multiplier corresponding
to the constraint in (79). Hence, the KKT conditions
for Problem 1 (given by (23)-(25)) can be simpli-
fied/rewritten as:
g′i(
xn
φnγn,i
)− λi + ν′n,i = 0, n ∈ Ni, ∀i, (80)
0 ≤ λi ⊥ (1−
∑
n∈Ni
xn,i/γn,i) ≥ 0, ∀i, (81)
0 ≤ ν′n,i ⊥ xn,i ≥ 0, n ∈ Ni, ∀i, (82)
where, ν′n,i := νn,iγn,i.
First assume that x is a solution (Nash equilibrium)
for Problem 1, so that the KKT conditions in (80)-(82) are
satisfied. We know that g′(·) > 0, owing to the assump-
tion that g(·) is strictly increasing and differentiable. This
along with (80) imply that λi > ν′n,i, n ∈ Ni ∀i, and
therefore, λi > 0,∀i. According to (81),∑
n∈Ni
xn,i
γn,i
= 1, ∀i. (83)
The assumption that g(·) is strictly concave implies that
g′(·) is strictly decreasing, and therefore is invertible.
The inverse of g′(·) would be also a strictly decreasing
function which we denote it by h(·). It follows from (80)
that:
s˜n,i :=
xn
φnγn,i
= h(λi, − ν′n,i), n ∈ Ni ∀i. (84)
Consider two users n,m ∈ Ni, where xn,i > 0, so that
ν′n,i = 0 (c.f. (82)). It follows that,
s˜n,i = h(λi) ≤ h(λi − ν′m,i) = s˜m,i, (85)
where the above inequality follows from the fact that h(·)
is a decreasing function. According to (83) and (85), we
may not increase xm,i for any user m, unless decreasing
xn,i for some user n with s˜n,i ≤ s˜m,i. So, by definition,
x satisfies PS-DSF.
Now consider an allocation x satisfying PS-DSF. For
such an allocation, there exists (at least) one resource at
each server i for which the capacity constraint holds with
equality. This along with (78) imply that the constraint
in (79) holds with equality at each server i. Hence, (81)
is established for all servers. For each server i, consider
some user n for which xn,i > 0. By definition, s˜p,i ≥
s˜n,i, ∀p, and s˜p,i = s˜n,i, ∀p : xp,i > 0. Hence, we may
choose λi := g′(s˜n,i), and
ν′m,i = λi − g′i(s˜m,i) ≥ 0, m ∈ Ni, ∀i, (86)
so that the first order optimality condition in (80) is
established. Furthermore, (86) implies that ν′m,i = 0
when xm,i > 0. So, all of the conditions in (80)-(82) are
established in conjunction with the chosen multipliers.
In other words, given a PS-DSF allocation, x, we may
find a set of multipliers such that the KKT conditions in
(80)-(82) are established. This implies that x is a solution
to Problem 1.
Proof of Theorem 5: The proof follows exactly the
same line of arguments as Theorem 4. Specifically, let λi,
and νn,i, denote the Lagrange multipliers corresponding
to the constraints in (19), and (20). The Lagrangian
function for Problem 2 at server i is given by:
Li(x, λ, ν) :=
∑
n∈Ni
[
φngi(
xn
φnγn,i
) +
∑
n
νn,ixn,i
]
+ λi
[
1−
∑
n∈Ni
xn,i
γn,i
]
. (87)
It can be observed that the KKT conditions for this
problem are exactly the same as those given by (80)-(82)
in Theorem 4. Hence, the same arguments apply here.
Proof of Corollary 2: As in Theorem 3, let n∗i :=
arg minn s˜n,i. Then, divide both sides of the inequality in
(69) for server i and user n∗i by g
′
i(s˜n∗i ,i)s˜n∗i ,i. It follows
that:
(s˜n∗i ,i)
−1 ≤
∑
m∈Ni
φm
xm,i
xm
[
s˜m,i
s˜n∗i ,i
g′i(s˜m,i)
g′i(s˜n∗i ,i)
]
. (88)
To simplify the right hand side of (88), let define:
qi(z) :=
1
zg′i(z)
=
( zAi )
αi−1
Ai +Bi(
z
Ai
)αi−1
. (89)
It can be observed that qi(z) is an increasing function.
Hence,
(s˜n,i)
−1 ≤ (s˜n∗i ,i)−1 ≤
∑
m∈Ni
φm
xm,i
xm
[
qi(s˜n∗i ,i)
qi(s˜m,i)
]
≤
∑
m∈Ni
φm
xm,i
xm
, ∀n, i, (90)
where the first and the last inequalities follow from the
fact that s˜n∗i ,i ≤ s˜m,i, ∀m. As in Theorem 3, we may sum
(90) over different servers to get the required result (c.f.
(72) and (73)).
Proof of Corollary 3: Consider a sequence, {αl, l ≥
1}, which converges to infinity, liml→∞ αl = ∞, and
{x(αl)} converges to some feasible x(∞) as l→∞. When
x(αl) is a solution to Problem 1, then for every feasible
allocation, y, it can be shown that (c.f. Theorem 1):∑
m
g′i(s˜m,i(αl))
ym,i − xm,i
γm,i
≤ 0, ∀i.
Now, consider an arbitrary user n and server i for which
yn,i 6= xn,i. As in Theorem 2, it can be shown that:
1 ≤
∑
m 6=n, hm,i>0
hm,i
g′i(s˜m,i(αl))
g′i(s˜n,i(αl))
, (91)
where hm,i := −γn,i(ym,i−xm,i)γm,i(yn,i−xn,i) <∞. On the other hand,
lim
l→∞
g′i(s˜m,i(αl))
g′i(s˜n,i(αl))
= lim
l→∞
[
s˜n,i(αl)
s˜m,i(αl)
]αl
, (92)
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provided that s˜n,i/Ai ≤ 1, n ∈ Ni. The limit in (92), and
therefore the right hand side of (91), approaches zero as
αl →∞, unless there exists some user p with hp,i > 0 and
s˜p,i(∞) ≤ s˜n,i(∞). In other words, for the inequality in
(91) to be established, there must exist some user p with
hp,i > 0 such that s˜p,i(∞) ≤ s˜n,i(∞). As in Theorem 2,
this implies that x(∞) satisfies PS-DSF.
Proof of Theorem 6: Let ∇xΨ = [(∇xΨ)n,i]NK×1
denote the gradient of Ψ with respect to x, and ∇λΨ =
[(∇λΨ)i,r]MK×1 denote the gradient of Ψ with respect to
λ. In particular,
(∇xΨ)n,i := ∂Ψ
∂xn,i
=
∂ψn,i
∂xn,i
+
∑
j
∂ψn,j
∂fn,j
∂fn,j
∂xn
 , (93)
(∇λΨ)i,r := ∂Ψ
∂λi,r
=
∑
m
∂ψm,i
∂fm,i
dm,r, (94)
where ψn,i := ψ(xn,i, fn,i(x, λi)), n ∈ Ni, and ψn,i =
0, n /∈ Ni. Let
dbψ :=
[
∂ψn,i
∂fn,i
∂fn,i
∂xn
]
NK×1
. (95)
(x, λ) is a stationary point of Ψ when ∇Ψ =
[∇xΨ;∇λΨ] = 0. If we pre-multiply ∇xΨ by dbψ, it
follows that (c.f. (93)):
(dbψ)
T∇xΨ =
∑
n,i
∂ψn,i
∂xn,i
∂ψn,i
∂fn,i
∂fn,i
∂xn
+
∑
n
(∑
i
∂ψn,i
∂fn,i
∂fn,i
∂xn
)2
= 0, (96)
where,
∂fn,i
∂xn
:=
−1
φnγ2n,i
g′′i (
xn
φnγn,i
) > 0, (97)
owing to strict concavity of gi(·). For the complementary
function ψ(a, b) defined in (36), it is shown that [30]:
∂ψ
∂a
∂ψ
∂b
≥ 0, ∀(a, b) ∈ R2, (98)
∂ψ
∂a
=
∂ψ
∂b
= 0 ⇐⇒ ψ(a, b) = 0. (99)
Hence, the right hand side of (96) is strictly positive, un-
less ∂ψn,i/∂xn,i = ∂ψn,i/∂fn,i = 0, ∀n, i, or equivalently
ψ(xn,i, fn,i(x, λi)) = 0, ∀n, i, which is the case only if x
is a solution to Problem 1. Conversely, for every solution
to Problem 1, ψ(xn,i, fn,i(x, λi)) = 0, ∀n, i, which implies
that ∂ψn,i/∂xn,i = ∂ψn,i/∂fn,i = 0, ∀n, i, and therefore
∇Ψ = 0.
Proof of Theorem 7: By contradiction, assume that
there exists another solution (x′, λ′), arbitrarily close to
(x, λ), for which x′m 6= xm, for some user m. Since (x′, λ′)
is arbitrarily close to (x, λ), by continuity we conclude
that fn,i(x′, λ′i) > 0 if fn,i(x, λi) > 0. Hence, x
′
n,i > 0 only
if fn,i(x, λi) = 0 (c.f. (29)). In the same way, λ′i,r > 0 only
if fi,r(xi) = 0. On the other hand, the assumption that
(x′, λ′) is a solution to Problem 3, implies that fi,r(x′i) =
0, for every server i and resource r with λ′i,r > 0 (c.f.
(28)). Hence,
∆fi,r := fi,r(x
′
i)− fi,r(xi) = 0, ∀i, r : λ′i,r > 0. (100)
Furthermore, (29) implies that fn,i(x′, λ′i) = 0, for every
user n and server i with x′n,i > 0. Hence,
∆fn,i := fn,i(x
′, λ′i)− fn,i(x, λi) = 0, ∀n, i : x′n,i > 0.(101)
Let δxn,i := x′n,i − xn,i and δλi,r := λ′i,r − λi,r. Since
(x′, λ′) could be arbitrarily close to (x, λ), it follows from
(100) and (101) that:
∆fi,r = −
∑
n
dn,rδxn,i = 0, ∀i, r : λ′i,r > 0, (102)
∆fn,i ' αiδxn
xn
[
φαin γ
αi−1
n,i A
αi
i
xαin
]
+
Biδxn
x2n
+
∑
r
dn,rδλi,r = 0, ∀n, i : x′n,i > 0, (103)
where δxn :=
∑
i δxn,i. Let r
∗(i) denote the only re-
source at server i for which λi,r∗(i) > 0. The fact that
fn,i(x, λi) = 0 for every user n with x′n,i > 0, implies
that:
dn,r∗(i)λi,r∗(i) =
φαin γ
αi−1
n,i A
αi
i
xαin
+
Bi
xn
. (104)
Hence, we may rewrite (103) as:
dn,r∗(i)δλi,r∗(i) + ωn,iδxn = 0, ∀n, i : x′n,i > 0, (105)
where, ωn,i is defined as:
ωn,i :=
[
αidn,r∗(i)λi,r∗(i)
xn
+
Bi(1− αi)
x2n
]
. (106)
In the following, we check the possibility for exis-
tence of (x′, λ′) such that (102) and (105) are estab-
lished. In general, one may partition the set of users,
and the set of servers respectively, into L partitions,
N = {N1,N2, · · · ,NL} and K = {K1,K2, · · · ,KL}, such
that x′n,i = 0 for each user n ∈ Nl and for every server
i /∈ Kl. Here, without loss of generality, we assume that
L = 1 is the greatest number of partitions which could
be found [Otherwise, we should consider each partition
separately].
By assumption,
∑
i δxm,i = δxm 6= 0 for user m.
Without loss of generality assume that δxm > 0. From
(105) it follows that δλi,r∗(i) < 0, for every server i for
which x′m,i > 0. Furthermore, (105) implies that δxn > 0
for every user n, for which x′m,jx
′
n,j > 0 for some server
j. Given that all users and all servers reside in the same
partition, it follows that δxn > 0 for all users, and
δλi,r∗(i) < 0 for all servers.
Let S, S := |S|, denote the set of servers for which
δxi = [δxn,i] 6= 0. For every server i ∈ S, (102) implies
that there exists some user p for which δxp,i < 0. On the
other hand, for each user n there exists some server i for
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which δxn,i > 0. Hence, x′n,i > 0 for at least N+S pairs of
users and servers, for which (105) should be established.
To present the system of equations in (105) in a matrix
form, let define χi := {n | x′n,i > 0}. Also, define
Wi = diag([ωn,i]), and Vi = Wi({n ∈ χi}, :) as a sub-
matrix of Wi, consisting of a subset of rows in Wi
which corresponds to users n ∈ χi. Then, the system
of equations in (105) can be written as:
d∗1 0 · · · 0 V1
0 d∗2 · · · 0 V2
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 · · · d∗S VS


δλ1,r∗(1)
...
δλS,r∗(S)
δx
 = 0, (107)
where d∗i := [dn,r∗(i) | n ∈ χi], and δx := [δxn | n ∈ N ].
Here, without loss of generality, we have assumed that
servers in S are indexed from 1 to S. As a short hand
notation, we denote the coefficient matrix in (107) by [D |
V ]. In the following we show that the coefficient matrix
in (107) has a column rank of N + S.
For the matrix V , we know that exactly one element is
non-zero in each row. Furthermore, there exists at least
a non-zero element in each column, owing to the fact
that for each user n, x′n,i > 0 for at least one server i.
Hence, we may find N linear independent rows in V ,
or equivalently N linear independent columns, which
form this matrix. It means that V is a full rank matrix
which has a column rank of N . Furthermore, from (105)
and (106), it can be observed that none of the columns
(or group of columns) in V can be expressed as a linear
combination of columns of D, provided that Bi > 0, ∀i.
Also, none of the columns (or group of columns) in D
can be expressed in terms of columns in V , owing to
the assumption that all users and all servers reside in
the same partition. Accordingly, the coefficient matrix,
[D,V ], has a column rank of N + S. Hence, the only
solution to (107) is δλi = 0, ∀i, and δx = 0. However,
this contradicts the assumption that δxm 6= 0 for user m.
Proof of Lemma 3: (vhx)i is the projection of −∇xiΨ
onto Ωi, when:
(vhx)i = arg min
vi∈Ωi
1
2
‖vi +∇xiΨ‖2. (108)
According to the constrained optimality theorem, (vhx)i
is a solution to minimization in (108) if and only if [34]:
[(vhx)i +∇xiΨ]T [vi − (vhx)i] ≥ 0, (109)
for every vi ∈ Ωi. Substituting vi = 0 results in:
(vhx)
T
i ∇xiΨ ≤ −‖(vhx)i‖2 (110)
which implies that vhx is a strictly descent direction,
unless vhx = 0. On the other hand, for every i, r with
(vhλ)i,r 6= 0, it follows from (47) and (48) that:
∂Ψ
∂λi,r
× (vhλ)i,r = −
(
∂Ψ
∂λi,r
)2
+ βhi,r
∂Ψ
∂λi,r
U
(
−βhi,r
∂Ψ
∂λi,r
)
< 0, (111)
which implies that vhλ is a strictly descent direction,
unless vhλ = 0.
Proof of Lemma 4: By contradiction, assume that
∇xΨ(xh, λh) 6= 0 and vh = [vhx;vhλ] = 0. Consider some
server i for which ∇xiΨ(xh, λh) 6= 0. The projection of−∇xiΨ onto Ωi can be found by solving the optimization
in (108). The problem in (108) is to minimize a convex
function over an affine feasible region (see the definition
of Ωi in (46)). The KKT conditions for this problem imply
that:
0 ≤ ςi,r ⊥ −(vhx)Ti dr ≥ 0, r ∈ Rhi : λi,r = 0, (112)
(vhx)
T
i dr = 0, r ∈ Rhi : λi,r > 0, (113)
(vhx)i +∇xiΨ +
∑
r∈Rhi
ςi,rdr = 0. (114)
Here, without loss of generality, we assume that the vec-
tors in {dr | r ∈ Rhi } are linear independent [Otherwise
we may restrict the conditions in Ωi to a subset A ⊆ Rhi
for which {dr | r ∈ A} are linear independent.]. The
projection of −∇xiΨ onto Ωi is zero, (vhx)i = 0, when:
−∇xiΨ =
∑
r∈Rhi
ςi,rdr, (115)
for some scalars ςi,r ∈ R satisfying (112). In other words,
vhx = 0 if and only if there exists some scalars ςi,r ∈ R,
so that (115) is established for all servers with ∇xiΨ 6= 0.
On the other hand, vhλ = 0 requires that (v˜
h
λ)i,r = 0, for
every r ∈ Rhi with λi,r > 0 (c.f. (48)). However, (v˜hλ)i,r =
0 only when ∂Ψ/∂λi,r = 0 and βhi,r = −dTr ∇xiΨ = 0
(c.f. (47)). it follows from (115) that:
βhi,r = −dTr ∇xiΨ = dTr
∑
r′∈Rhi
ςi,r′dr′ . (116)
Since the vectors {dr | r ∈ Rhi } are linear independent,
It follows from (116) that βhi,r = 0 only when ςi,r = 0.
Hence, ςi,r = 0 for every r ∈ Rhi with λi,r > 0.
So, the right hand side of (115) would be zero under
Assumption 1. That is, ∇xiΨ = 0, ∀i. This, however,
violates the contradictory assumption.
Now let Assumption 1 do not hold, so that for server
i with ∇xiΨ 6= 0 there exists some resource r ∈ Rhi
with λi,r = 0 and ςi,r > 0 (c.f. (112)). Let R¯hi := {r ∈
Rhi | λi,r = 0 and ςi,r > 0}. Then, (115) implies that
∂Ψ/∂xn,i < 0, for every user n with dn,r > 0, r ∈ R¯hi .
On the other hand, ∂Ψ/∂xn,i = 0 for every user n /∈ Ni
(c.f. (93)). Hence, (115) may not be established if there
exists some user n /∈ Ni with dn,r > 0, r ∈ R¯hi , which is
the case under Assumption 2. In other words, (115) may
not be established under Assumption 2.
.
